INTRODUCTION

18
Lowering the absolute energy demand of buildings is a key policy goal of the EU. This is to be achieved 19 mainly through improvements in end-use efficiency [1] . The indicative goal for Year 2020 is to lower 20 primary energy demand within the EU by 20% relative to a business-as-usual scenario. This goal is part of 21 the EU Climate and Energy Packet (known colloquially as the EU 202020 goal), and also includes the 22 mandatory goals that by Year 2020 there should be a 20% share for renewables in the energy supply and a 23 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (relative to the levels in Year 1990) [2] . For the residential 24 sector, the energy savings target has been set at the higher level of 27% given the well-documented 25 savings opportunities that exist in this sector [3] . The multifaceted motivations behind the overall energy 26 savings goal include reducing dependence on fossil fuels imported from outside the EU, mitigating the 27 volatility associated with oil prices, increasing competitiveness by reducing energy costs, stimulating 28 employment in the construction sector, improving both the indoor and outdoor air quality via improved 29 ventilation and decreased emissions of combustion gasses, reducing noise pollution, and mitigating 30 climate change. However, studies have shown that the EU is on target to meet only half of its Year 2020 31 overall energy savings goal [4] . In addition, the negotiations surrounding the Energy Efficiency Directive 32 [5] have highlighted that it is not possible to lower EU Primary Energy Demand by more than 17% using 33 the measures agreed in the directive, meaning that a de facto 3% watering down of the savings through 34 efficiency target has occurred. 35 1 Nomenclature 
CH
High-, Medium-or Low-impact Policy
A policy listed in the MURE Policy Database that is estimated to reduce demand by >0.5%, 0.1%-0.5% or <0.1%, respectively.
Laspeyres Decomposition
A method of index decomposition in which model variables are each in turn changed to their final year (Year 2010) values, while the other model variables are kept at their base year (Year 1990) values. This allows the individual impact of a variable-on-demand to be estimated.
LSDV
Least-Squares Dummy Variable-fixed effects panel data regression model.
MURE Policy Database
An online database of all national and EU-wide sector-level efficiency policies that have been introduced in the EU-28 countries and Norway since the 1970's. NEEAP National Energy Efficiency Action Plan SQI Semi-quantitative impact. The name given to the ex post or ex ante evaluations of each of the policies in the MURE database. Policies are ranked as having a low, medium or high impact on the demand reduction in which they are found to or expected to result.
These rankings are used in the present work to construct the EP, Financial, Informative and Regulatory policy variables. Unit consumption of energy for space heating (kWh/m 2 /year) A time series variable constructed for the purpose of this work that represents the sum of each energy carrier used for heating divided by total floor area. The unit is the square metre. Unit consumption is an established indicator of energy efficiency progress, as it tracks changes in energy use related to efficiency improvement and is not influenced by changes in either population or dwelling size. VIF Variance inflation factor. A statistical tool to detect the multicolinearity of a number of explanatory variables. WAP Weighted Average Price. A time series variable constructed for the purpose of the present work that aggregates the prices of different energy carriers for heating into a single price weighted according to the proportion of each energy carrier in the heating mix.
Wald (F)Test
A parametric statistical test used to examine the combined significance of a number of explanatory variables.
Wu-Hausman test
A statistical hypothesis test used to examine a model for endogeneity.
Over the last decade, the European Commission has introduced a package of measures aimed at achieving 1 the Year 2020 goal of a 20% reduction in primary energy demand. These measures include the Energy 2
Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [6] , the Energy Services Directive [7] , the Eco Design 3
Directive [8] , and the Energy Labelling of Products Directive [9] . These are policy measures that seek to 4 drive technical innovation, the diffusion of efficient technologies, and the creation of a market for 5 efficiency. More recently, additional policies that aim to improve or enhance the aforementioned factors 6 have been introduced or debated, namely, the recast of the EPBD [10] , the Energy Efficiency Directive 7
[11], and the proposed Energy Taxation Directive [12] . These EU directives are transposed into national 8 policy legislation by the respective countries and complement the energy savings measures that individual 9 countries have introduced to varying degrees since the 1970's [13, 14] . 10 A study that looked at 30 years of experience in OECD countries with polices for increasing energy 11 efficiency [15] did the same for seven EU countries and Bigano et al. [32] did the same for all sectors. The two latter 9 studies [31 and 32] found that energy efficiency in the residential sector had been improved by the 10 application of, in particular, mandatory standards for buildings. Filippini et al. [30] found that financial 11 measures had the greatest impact, mandatory standards for appliances or buildings less of an impact; they 12 found no improvement in efficiency from informative policies. 13
These last three cited papers [30] [31] [32] represent a discourse initiated by Bigano et al. [32] in which panel 14 data econometric methods are used to examine the extents to which the energy efficiency-focused policies 15 introduced across the EU have succeeded in reducing energy demand. The three papers differ from more 16 common residential sector models in the literature, e.g. [16, 33] , in that they explicitly include variables 17 that account for the introduction of energy efficiency policies. While all three papers provide valuable 18 insights into modelling methods and the impact of efficiency policies, the method that they use for 19 quantifying the actual efficiency policies in place is somewhat rudimentary. Bigano et al. [32] state in 20 their conclusions that: 'It would be more interesting to use continuous instead of binary policy variables', 21
while Saussay et al. [31] write that: 'Finally, the parameterization we chose for the building energy codes 22 is admittedly fairly simple, and would call for further improvements'. Therefore, the present study 23 develops the aspect regarding the modelling of efficiency policy and as such presents a further 24 contribution to the discourse. Our focus is on the case of space heating energy demand in the EU-15 25 residential sector from 1990 to 2010. In addition, this paper describes other methodological developments, 26 which are outlined in the Methodology section and expands the literature review to place the work in a 27 broader perspective. In light of the methodological developments, the results obtained in the present work 28 reinforce the general findings of the previous studies [30] [31] [32] 
Policy parameterization
Index that increases by 20, 10 or 1 every time a High-, Medium-, or Low-impact policy is introduced respectively.
Separate dummy variables for cases of 1-2 or ≥3 policies in a particular category that are in force.
Index that increases by 1 for every year a policy is in force.
Dummy variable for each year at least one policy in a particular category is in force. Table 1 presents a comparison of the methodologies employed in the work presented in this paper and that 1 used in the previous studies [30] [31] [32] . In summary, the present paper encompasses methodological 2 advances that implement changes to: 1) the way that the policy data are interpreted (see Section 2.2); 2) 3 the time period used for the analysis; 3) how the time series of energy prices is calculated (see Section 4 2.3); 4) the process by which the econometric testing of model results is carried out (See Section 3.1); and 5 5) the dependant variable used (Unit Consumption for Space Heating). 6
Inclusion of policy variables in model
Policy Categories Modelled
Model description 7
The linear regression model of unit consumption for space heating, Iit, takes the form:
where P it is a weighted average (by heating energy carrier for each individual country) real price of 10 energy, Yit is income per capita, CHit is the percentage of dwellings with central heating installed, HDDit 11 are heating degree days which are a proxy variable for the outdoor climate, t is a time trend, EPit is a 12 numerical representation of the energy efficiency policies in place, and ε it is the residual term. The i and t 13 subscripts in Eq. (1) give the spatial and temporal parameters of the panel, respectively. Initially, other 14 choices of dependent variables for heating were tested, including the total heating demand (space heating 15 plus water heating plus heat for cooking), total per capita, and total per square metre. However, it was 16 decided to perform the work only for unit consumption for space heating for the EU-14 after taking into 17 consideration the following issues: (i) data availability; (ii) the need to have a balanced panel to facilitate 18 some statistical tests; (iii) structural differences between the newer and older Member States of the EU 19 due to the former having had price controls in their energy markets; (iv) the research question to be Legislative/Normative; (vi) Co-operative; and (vii) Unknown (as designated in the MURE Policy 32 Database). Table 3 lists examples of some of these policy categories for the case of Austria. Previous 33 studies [30, 32] have also used the MURE Policy Database to model the effects of efficiency policies.
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Both investigations introduce dummy variables in their models for the years during which subcategories 35 of policies, e.g., building regulations, are in force (See Table 1 ). Filippini et al. [30] represents an advance 36 on the work of Bigano et al. [32] in this regard, since the former distinguishes between the number of 1 policies implemented, i.e., it uses separate dummy variables respectively for cases of 1-2 or ≥3 policies in 2 a particular subcategory that are in force. The work presented in this paper is an advance on both these 3 studies [30 and 32] because it goes beyond binary representations of policies in place to represent them as 4 a time series, which increases as more policies are introduced and decreases as policies become obsolete 5 ( Figure 1 ). 6
The MURE Policy Database also provides a semi-quantitative impact (SQI) ranking of each policy 7 contained therein. These SQI rankings have been carried out by the respective energy agencies in each 8 country that are responsible for the policy content of the database and are based on an estimation of the 9 energy savings achievable or achieved by each policy. These SQI's are grouped into three bands, high, 10 medium and low, depending on whether they describe policies that are expected or that have been found 11 to reduce energy demand in their sector of focus by >0.5%, 0.1%-0.5%, and <0.1%, respectively. For 12 example, a low impact policy as designated in the MURE Policy Database is one that has been found to 13 lower or is expected to lower demand by less than 0.1%. It is these SQI's that are used to construct the 14 policy time series [EP in Eq. (1) In order to construct a time-series variable that represented efficiency policy in place, it was initially 18 thought that each policy could in turn be assigned values of 5, 2.5, and 1 for each year that they were in 19 force, corresponding to the three SQI impact bands described above. However, an examination of the 20 qualitative descriptions of specific policies that accompany each SQI revealed that policies rated as low 21 impact are usually associated with very low expected savings in comparison to medium-impact and high-22 impact policies. Therefore, for the purposes of the present work, the three bands are assigned values of 20, 23 10, and 1, respectively. In other words a policy classed as a medium impact policy in the MURE Policy 24
Database is assumed to lead to a ten times higher demand reduction than a low impact policy. This 25 grading scheme is applied to all categories of policy and all countries. Thus, for the example of Austria 26 shown in Table 3 general estimated to have a ten-fold greater impact on demand than the low-impact policies, while the 36 high-impact policies are estimated to have 1-16-fold greater impacts than the medium-impact policies. An 37 examination of Finland and Germany revealed differences in the SQI's of the medium-and high-impact 38 policies at the higher end of the 1-16-fold range highlighted for France. Italy, Greece, and the UK were 39
closer to the lower end of the range for France. Following calibration tests using the averages of the 40 differences between the SQI's of high-, medium-, and low-impact policies, the aforementioned values of 1 20, 10, and 1, respectively, were chosen. 2
No distinction is made between say a medium-impact financial policy in Austria and one in another 3 country, despite the fact that for Austria this could amount to a Heating cost settlement for common 4 thermal facilities (see Table 3 ), whereas for say France, a medium-impact financial policy could amount to 5 a zero-rated eco-loan (FRA 31). Distinguishing between policy types at a national level would increase 6 significantly the level of disaggregation in the model and would represent a deviation from the focus on 7 improving the representation of policies heretofore implemented in previous studies [30] [31] [32] . Nevertheless, 8
this is an area that warrants further research. As the EP time series in Eq. (1) is an aggregation of the high-9
, medium-, and low-impact policies, the β 6 term in Eq. (1) represents the actual demand reduction 10 achieved from the expected (SQI) impact of a low-impact policy. 11
For the 14 countries that are in focus in the present work, the database contains 329 residential sector 12 policies. Of these, six are defined as cross-cutting, and therefore are excluded from the work because they 13 represent energy and carbon taxes of various types that would already be represented in the energy price 14 time series (Pit) in Eq. (1). Similarly, 15 regionally focused polices in Belgium, e.g., Flanders or Wallonia, 15
were not included, whereas federal policies for the same country were included. In addition, 48 policies 16 that focus exclusively on electricity demand for appliances and lighting were also ignored. Of the 17 remaining 260 policies, 202 are focused on heat and 58 are focused on both heat and electricity (See Table  18 2). An example of the latter is a policy named "Energy advice for households", which obviously applies to 19 both heating and other household uses of energy. 20 altering the benefits and/or costs in order to encourage energy efficiency investments; and, finally, 27 information aims at shifting priorities by building awareness. Several assumptions were needed to apply 28 this categorisation to the policies in the MURE Policy Database. Although policies that are labelled 29 'Legislative/Informative' are regulatory, in that they mandate the display of information, these policies 30 have been categorised as informative, since market transformation via information is their main goal.
31
Most of the policies in this category refer to the EU EPBD and the Energy Labelling of Products 32 directives [6, 9] . While the EU EPBD directive contains regulatory components, such as the mandatory 33 inspection of boilers, the main focus of both directives is the energy labelling of buildings and appliances, 1 respectively. Policies in the database categorised as 'Co-operative' or 'Unknown' were each examined in 2 turn to define their placements. Although the Co-operative policy shown in the example for Austria (Table  3 2 ) is ostensibly information-driven, its main contribution with respect to the residential sector is in 4 relation to minimum standards for standby, which makes it a regulatory policy for the classification 5 applied in this work. For some countries, notably, the Netherlands, many of the policies listed are labelled 6 as 'Co-operative'. This is because in the Netherlands, there is strong representation of housing 7 organisations, which make voluntary agreements with the authorities to reduce energy demand. Each of 8 these polices have been categorised on an ad hoc basis to determine if they are more regulatory or 9 informative in nature. Policies labelled Financial, i.e., grants for renewables, were included. Many of these 10 refer to grants or subsidies for the installation of heat pumps and solar photovoltaic (PV) or collector 11 panels, all of which would reduce the final energy demand, as listed in the energy statistics. Table 2 shows 12 the numbers of policies for each category based on the categorisation carried out for the present work.
13
Most of these policies were implemented in the period 1990-2010, while others were already in force in 14 1990. 15 
22
As an example, for Austria, the database includes nine heat-focused energy efficiency measures, four 23 electricity efficiency-focused measures, and one measure that covers both heat and electricity. These 24 fourteen policies were introduced between 1989 and 2009 and are all still in force ( Table 3) . Six of the 25
Austrian measures have received a high SQI, three have received a medium score, one a low score, and 26 four have had their SQI graded as "Unknown". The policies without an SQI ranking are assumed to have a 27 low impact on demand. The fourteen policies are divided into the Financial (Fin), Regulatory (Reg), and 28
Informative (Info) categories in line with the categorisation used in the present work, although those that 1 focus exclusively on electricity are not included in the subsequent analysis. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3  2 show the categorisation of the policy measures applied by the authors of this paper, while the remaining 3 columns are based on data from the MURE Policy Database [13] . Thus, Policy Type and SQI are MURE 4 categorisations for each measure. As all the measures are still in force, the column Duration gives the 5 starting year of the policy measure. The column that follows Duration indicates whether the measures 6
were the result of an EU directive or not, while the last column lists the MURE Policy Database codes for 7
Households. 8 Figure 1 shows the cumulative SQI ranking of the 260 polices analysed in this work. The difference 9 between the numbers shown in Table 2 and those shown in Figure 1 is that rather than show the number of 10 policies in force for the EU-14, the latter takes into account the different rankings assigned to each policy 11 in the MURE Policy Database (high-, medium-, and low-impact policies) and also the years in which each 12 policy was in force. Thus the y-axis of Figure 1 represents the cumulative value of the SQI of the policies 13 in force in each of the three categories for the 14 countries analysed in this work (cf a high-impact policy 14 in force is assigned a value of 20, a medium-impact policy gets a 10, and a low-or unknown-impact 15 policy gets a values of 1 
21
As it may take several years for the impacts of policies introduced to be realised in terms of energy 22 demand reductions, the EP variable is tested with delays of up to 7 years. This approach of effectively 23 lagging the EP variable also removes the possibility of endogeneity between EP and I for the lagged cases.
24
Bigano et al. [32] and Saussay et al. [31] also incorporated delayed impacts of policies (See Table 1 ). 25 
Financial
Informative Regulatory
Taking the example of Austria ( of energy for space heating to be constructed. As a ton of oil equivalent (toe) of oil does not produce the 20 same amount of heat as a toe of natural gas or coal (given their different conversion efficiencies when 21 used in household boilers), the IEA prices for oil, natural gas, and coal were divided by a factor of 0.78, 22 0.85, and 0.64 [48] , respectively, to obtain the prices of heat from these respective energy carriers prior to 23 their inclusion in the WAP 2 . Prices for biomass for the respective countries are not available in national 24 statistics due to the nature of the trade in this commodity. Thus, the options were to include biomass in the 25 energy demand time series (I it ) but not in the weighted average energy price time series or to omit biomass 26 from the energy demand time series; best-fit modelling indicated that the latter option was best. This price 27 time-series thus provides a more accurate estimation of the actual price paid by households for residential 28 sector energy demand than those used in [30] [31] [32] (See Table 1 ). 29
For Finland (1990 Finland ( -1994 and Portugal (1990 Portugal ( -1999 , no data were available from [43] on the demand for 30 residential sector electricity and space heating respectively. In these two cases, time series for residential 31 sector electricity and total energy demand obtained from [46] and [43] respectively were used to 32 extrapolate the missing data. Prices for district heating were not available for most countries for 2009 and 33 2010. To obtain a complete time series, the district heating prices for each country for Year 2008 were 34 increased by a factor that corresponded to the change in price of the main heating fuel of the specific 1 country for the period 2008-2010. The justification for this approach is that although district heating can 2 be cheaper than alternative heating fuels, its price is usually maintained just below that of its main 3 competitor. 4 Values shown in parentheses denote HAC standard errors. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. *Significant at 10% level.
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The difference between the six models presented in Table 4 relates to how the time series representing 12 policies focused on energy efficiency (EP) 3 are included in the models. In the basic model, EP are not 13 included at all. In the Delay0 model, they are included for the year in which they were published. For the 14 remaining four models, they are included with delays of 1, 3, 5, and 7 years, respectively, after Table 4 for EP are
18
instead calculated as percentages then they represent the percentage reductions in demand for the 19 introduction of one new low-impact policy (e.g., -0.0017 expressed as a percentage is -0.17%.). 20
The variable coefficients presented in Table 4 have the expected polarities, in the sense that, for example, 1 when price goes up demand is expected to fall. The price (β 1 ), HDD (β 3 ) and Trend (β 5 ) coefficients are 2 found to be significant at the 5% level for all models. The income (β 2 ) and CH (β 4 ) coefficients are 3 insignificant in all models. Saussay et al. [31] also found the coefficient of income to be insignificant. 4
However, removing Ireland and Portugal from the panel used in the present work resulted in the income 5 elasticity (β 2 ) value increasing to >0.6 and becoming significant at the 5% level 4 . During the period 1990-6 2010, these two countries enjoyed large increases in per capita income that were not coupled to any 7 similarly large increases in the use of space heating. It seems that in the absence of economic booms, as 8 experienced in Ireland and Portugal in recent years, the income elasticity for the EU-14 would be higher 9 and significant. Given the lack of statistical significance of the CH variable the F-form of the Wald test 10 was used to examine the effect on the model of omitting it. It was found that the model was not improved 11 by omitting the CH variable 5 .The F-test for the combined significance of variables was found to be 12 significant at the 1% level for all the models. 13
The absolute values of variable coefficients are also in line with those previously published [16, 31, price elasticities for total energy demand of -0.025 and -0.140, respectively, for OECD Europe, and short-21 term and long-term income elasticities for energy of 0.052 and 0.291, respectively. These results for long-22 term elasticities are similar to those found in the present work. Azevedo et al. [34] calculated price 23 elasticities for electricity for the EU of -0.2, which is similar to the value obtained in the present work.
24
EEW [50] reported that autonomous technical progress brings about a 1% per annum reduction in demand 25 across the EU, which corresponds with the coefficients calculated for the time trend in Table 4 and  26  Table 5 . Overall, in the present study, the price and income, as well as other calculated elasticities seem to 27 conform to what has been reported in the literature. 28
Although the coefficient of the EP variable is not statistically significant in the Delay0 and Delay1 29 models, it is in the subsequent models. It is clear that as time passes the absolute value and statistical 30 significance of the coefficient of the EP variable increase, while those of the Price, Income, and Trend 31 variables decrease. This suggests that initially the impact of EP on demand is negligible compared to 32 4 Each country was removed in turn from the panel to investigate if there were any significant impacts onβ 1 to β 6 .
The above mentioned finding in relation to income elasticity (β 2 ) was the only major deviation from the results presented in Table 4 found.
these three other variables but that after a number of years its relative impact increases. During its year of 1 introduction, a low-impact policy reduces demand by 0.071%. This makes sense given that low-impact 2 policies are ranked as those that reduce demand by <0.1% (see Section 2.2). After 5 years, the policy 3 impact has tripled to -0.21% and become statistically significant. 4
Given the disparities in the sizes of the 14 countries included in the panel, e.g., Germany and Ireland, a 5 weighted least-squares regression using the same model variables was used to investigate the size effect. 6
For this, the data for each country were weighted by the square root of its population. This weighting was 7 applied to all the variables, with the exceptions of the time trend and the policy variables. The results 8 obtained were very similar to those shown for the non-weighted models in Tables 3 and 4 , suggesting that 9 in this case size does not matter. 10 VIF tests carried out for multicolinearity did not show a VIF value >6 for any variable, indicating that 11 multicolinearity is not a problem for the data and model used. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors [53] were 12 calculated to correct for the possible presence of inter-country spatial correlation in the data set. The 13 calculated Driscoll-Kraay standard errors were smaller than the HAC standard errors. Although Kraay standard errors can be biased downwards in small panels, the one used in the present work is in the 15 range suggested by the authors (T>20 and N not important), which suggests that for this dataset, spatial 16 correlation is not a problem. [56]. These five instruments were chosen as possible explanatory variables for the EP variable that were 22 not correlated with energy demand in the residential sector. The idea behind the first three instruments 23 listed was that governments might increase the implementation of efficiency policies as a result of a green 24 party being in government or in reaction to increased CO 2 emissions. The idea behind the last two 25 instruments was that a regime change in another sector, e.g., transport, might indicate general energy 26 policy development in an unrelated sector, e.g., housing. To determine if EP was endogenous, it was 27 regressed in a model that included one of the five instruments and the other explanatory variables from 28
Eq. (1). The residuals from this auxiliary regression were then added to Eq. (1) 6 Data for CO 2 emissions standards for vehicles for the years 1990 to 1994 and 1996 to 1999 were not available and so were interpolated and estimated based on the data that was available for 1995 and 2000 to 2010. Table 5 are   5 slightly different from those shown in Table 4 .
6
b Values shown in parentheses denote HAC standard errors. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. *Significant at 10% level.
7
In Table 5 , the same models as in Table 4 are presented except that the variable EP is divided into the 8 three policy categories of financial, informative, and regulatory. The polarities and absolute values for the 9 price, income, HDD, CH, and trend coefficients in the models shown in Table 5 are similar to those shown 10 in Table 4 . However, examining the statistical significance of the coefficients representing the financial, 11
informative, and regulatory policies shows that only the latter is significant in the Delay0 and Delay1 12 models. This suggests that the coefficient of the EP variable described in the previous paragraph is not 13 significant in the Delay0 and Delay1 models owing to the lack of significance of the impacts of the 14 financial and informative policies. Regulatory policies seem to be the most effective type of energy 15 efficiency policies when the expected impacts, as provided by the MURE Policy Database, are evaluated.
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The regression coefficients in Table 5 can be interpreted to mean that the introduction of one unit of 17 regulatory policy (i.e., one 'low-impact' policy (See Nomenclature and Section 2.2)) has reduced the 18 energy demand by an average of 0.25% in the year of introduction. As this is greater than the <0.1% 19 impact expected for low-impact policies, it can be concluded that regulatory policies have on average 20 performed better than expected. The results also point to different profiles over time for the three policy 21 types: 22  Regulatory policies have a strong impact already in the year of introduction, and this impact is 1 consistent over the years that follow. This is what would be expected from policies of this type, 2 e.g., building codes with minimum efficiency requirements. 3  Financial policies show a low impact in the year of introduction, and require a number of years 4 before they reduce demand by >0.1% and reach statistical significance. This might be expected 5 from, for example, subsidies for new technologies whereby more and more house owners adopt 6 the new technology, resulting in a cumulative increase in impact. 7  Information policies show the opposite effect, with an increasing coefficient but falling statistical 8 significance after being in force for 1 year. This may be explained by people getting used to 9 information and returning to previous habits and routines after an initial change of behaviour. 10
The literature on the respective impacts of financial, informative, and regulatory efficiency policies in the 11 residential sector corroborates these findings. Table 5 shows that the correlation between the estimated 12 impact of informative policies from the MURE Policy Database and the savings that actually occurred is 13 low and statistically insignificant. This is similar to previous studies [30, 57] Member States in terms of the levels of ambition of their energy efficiency policies and that in the less-33 progressive countries many experts consider the first EPBD [6] to be a milestone that catalyses a new 34 legal framework for energy use in buildings. Of the portfolio of policy measures in place across the EU, 35 the IEA [64] reported that up to now the EPBD (categorised as an information policy in this work) has 36 been the policy instrument with the greatest potential impact on energy efficiency in existing residential 37 buildings in the short-term ( 5-10-year period) or even in the medium-term up to Year 2020. As the EPBD 38 
Implication of calculated coefficients
20
For the EU-14 overall, the average percentage increase in energy prices between 1990 and 2010 has been 21 1% per year (this value encompasses the increases and decreases in prices over the period, as shown in 22 Figure 2 ). The average percentage increase in income for the same period has been 2%. If the coefficients 23 calculated in the present work (Table 4 and Table 5 ) were to persist after 2010 one could expect that a 1% 24 rise in the price of energy would result in a 0.15% fall in demand ceteris paribus. If at the same time, 25 income would increase by only 1% per annum (half the rate seen in the previous decades), this would 26 offset the energy savings resultant from higher prices. The penetration of central heating has been steady 27 at 1% per year for the period 1990-2010, although as this is approaching saturation, i.e., >90% penetration 28 in most countries, the same rate of growth cannot be expected in the future. Regardless of price and 29 income dynamics or the impact of policy, demand can be expected to fall by a compounded 1% per year, 30 due to factors represented by the time trend (autonomous technical progress, fuel switching, and structural 31 effects). While autonomous technical progress and fuel switching from direct electric heating, oil heating 32 and solid fuels heating to district heating, renewables 7 and natural gas heating can be expected to continue 33 in the coming decades, future structural effects are less clear. During the period 1990-2010, increasing 34 indoor temperatures would have diluted the effects of efficiency as represented by the time trend. Going 35 forward, this effect should be diminished as homes converge on a standard indoor temperature of around 36 21°C. However, the effects of people spending more time at home, e.g., more retirees and more people 1 working from home, could have a similar diluting effect 8 . Nonetheless, two of the aforementioned factors 2 represented by the time trend (autonomous technical progress and fuel switching) should continue to 3 reduce demand apace. 4
The results of the present work also show that regulatory policies reduced demand for space heating by 5 around 0.3% for each low-impact policy introduced. Given that medium-impact and high-impact policies 6 are assumed to have ten and twenty times, respectively, the impact of low-impact policies (See Section 2.2 7
), this suggests that the introduction of such regulatory policies would reduce demand by 3% and 6%, 8 respectively 9 . It should be borne in mind that such large impacts reflect the fact that such policies are not 9 introduced very often (e.g. for Austria. there was only one high-impact and one medium-impact regulatory 10 policy introduced between 1990 and 2010; Table 3 ) and they represent the averages for a wide variety of 11 regulatory policy impacts across the 14 countries studied. Therefore, it may be the case that the data 12 representing the policies are too disparate for a strong emphasis to be placed on the calculated values.
13
Thus, the differences in magnitudes of the three policy categories may be of more interest than the 14 numbers themselves. EEW [50] advocates a savings target of 2% per annum, composed of a combination 15 of efficiency policies and autonomous technical progress, based on the idea that savings of 1% per annum 16 are already being made and that this should be doubled. The numerical results from the present work 17
suggest that this can be achieved through the introduction of more or stronger regulatory policies (e.g., the 18 introduction of an additional medium-rank policy every 3 years or an additional high-rank policy every 6 19 years). However, given the uncertainty related to the exact impact of policies on savings, the message 20 from this paper for policymakers is to increase either the ambition level or the number of regulatory 21 policies in force. shown in Table 6 (chosen as a representative model) were multiplied by the respective time series data for 25 1990 used in their calculation, except that each variable was in turn changed to its 2010 value (while 26 keeping the other time series data at 1990 values), to isolate their effects on demand relative to those of 27 the other variables. The time series variables used for the decomposition for 1990 and 2010 were the 28 averages for each variable for the 14 EU countries. Table 6 shows the magnitude that each model variable 29 increased or decreased demand in 2010 relative to 1990. The impact on demand of the time trend, which 30 represents autonomous technical progress, fuel switching, and structural effects, stands out as it accounts 31 for >20% of the change. Energy efficiency policies resulted in an approximately 11% reduction most of 32 which was as a result of regulatory and informative policies. Energy price increases were modest during 33 this period and decreased energy demand by less than 3%. At the same time, income dynamics increased 1 demand by over 10%. This corresponds to the pre-financial crisis period of economic growth in the EU. 2
The introduction of CH increased demand by approximately 4%, while a number of colder-than-average 3 winters increased demand by over 10%. 4 
